Implementation of techniques for adversarial detection in image classification by FUMAROLA, ROBERTA
UNIVERSITA` DI PISA
Dipartimento di Ingegneria dell’Informazione
Master Degree in Computer Engineering
Graduate Thesis
Implementation of techniques for
adversarial detection in image
classification
Supervisors:
Prof. Fabrizio Falchi
Prof. Roberto Caldelli
Prof. Giuseppe Amato
Candidate:
Roberta Fumarola
Accademic Year 2016/2017
Contents
1 Background 2
1.1 Convolutional Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.1 ConvNet Layers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1.2 ConvNet training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2 Linear explanation of adversarial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.1 Fooling a linear classiﬁer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3 Adversarial robustness of a linear classiﬁer . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4 Techniques for generating adversarials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.4.1 Fast Gradient sign method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.4.2 Evolutionary Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.4.3 Box constrained method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.5 Solutions to make more robust a neural network . . . . . . . . . 23
1.5.1 Training adversarial examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.5.2 Noise injection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.5.3 Auto Encoder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.5.4 Denoising Auto Encoder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.5.5 Deep Contractive network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2 Preliminar tests 32
2.1 OverFeat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.2 Generating Adversarial Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.2.1 Fooling images generated with Box Constrained . . . . . 34
2.2.2 Fooling images generated with Fast Gradient . . . . . . . 35
2.3 Analysi of the features space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.3.1 Average distances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.4 Search of kNNs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3 Final experiments 48
3.1 Features extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
1
3.2 Knn lists and classiﬁcation of the queries with OverFeat . . . . 50
3.2.1 Software classiﬁcation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.2.2 OverFeat classiﬁcation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3 Adversarial detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.4 Esperimental results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.4.1 Uncorrectly classiﬁed images . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.4.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4 Conclusions 60
2
Introduction
The earliest approach to Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AI) was the implementation of
programs in order to solve problems that human brains performed easily, such
as understanding text or recognizing objects in an image. The major issue
in those years was the restricted capability of computers to solve problems,
because, in order to get a result, they had to follow a set of speciﬁc instructions
(algorithms). But that set of instructions worked well only if the solution of the
problem was already known. Computations were too expensive and computers
had to have access to huge amounts of informations in order to be smart. As
a consequence, ﬁrst works gave very disappointing results and their progress
were too slow. Researchers understood that a new approach was necessary.
The ﬁrst step toward Artiﬁcial Neural Networks (ANNs) came in 1943 when
Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts (a neurophysiologist and a mathematician
respectively) wrote a paper on how neurons might work. In 1949 Donald Hebb
reinforced the concept of neurons in The Organization of Behavior  book, by
pointing out that knowledge and learning occured in the brain through the
formation and change of synapses between neurons.
The advancement in electronic computers allowed in the 1950s the basis
of these theories to be modelled by IBM's Nathanial Rochester in the ﬁrst
computer simulation of a neural network. In the following years, Frank Rosen-
blatt, a neurobiologist of Cornell, intrigued with the operation of the eye of
a ﬂy, began work on the Perceptron: a mathematical model of how neurons
operate in our brains. The perceptron was ﬁrst implemented as a software for
the IBM 704 and it was subsequently implemented in custom-built hardware
as the Mark 1 perceptron.
Despite these successes in neural networks, traditional von Neumann architec-
ture took over the computing scene, and neural research was left behind. In
addition, many people in the ﬁeld were using a ﬂawed learning function, be-
cause of the use of a threshold activation function that was not diﬀerentiable
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Figure 1: Mark I Perceptron at the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory. Hardware imple-
mentation of the ﬁrst Perceptron.
across the entire line. As a result, research and funding went drastically down.
This was strengthened by the fact that the early successes of some neural net-
works led to an exaggeration of the potential of neural networks, especially
considering the practical technology at the time. Promises went unfulﬁlled
and writers began to talk about the eﬀect that the "thinking machines" would
have on humans.
In 1982, interest in the ﬁeld was renewed. John Hopﬁeld of Caltech pre-
sented a paper to the National Academy of Sciences, in which introduced a
neural network with neurons connected in bidirectional way. That same year,
Reilly and Cooper used a hybrid network with multiple layers, each layer using
a diﬀerent problem-solving strategy. But the real catalyst that brought new
funds and researches in this ﬁeld was a conference (in the same year) where
Japan announced a new Fifth Generation eﬀort on neural networks. USA
began to worry that the they could be left behind in the ﬁeld.
In 1986, with multiple layered neural networks in the news, the problem
was how to extend the Widrow-Hoﬀ rule to multiple layers. Three indepen-
dent groups of researchers, one of which included David Rumelhart, a for-
mer member of Stanford's psychology department, came up with similar ideas
which are now called back propagation networks because it distributes pat-
tern recognition errors throughout the network. Hybrid networks used just
two layers, these back-propagation networks use many. The result is that
back-propagation networks are "slow learners," needing possibly thousands of
iterations to learn. By 1985 the American Institute of Physics began what has
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become an annual meeting: Neural Networks for Computing.
Back to the present, neural networks are used in several applications and
ANNs have recently evolved into Deep Neural Networks (DNNs). DNNs has
successfully addressed many problems such as image classiﬁcation, language
translation and identifying spam in email. Neural networks architecture be-
came more intricated and their computational capability have had a marked
improvement.
Despite this and the high performances reached in classiﬁcation tasks, they
have to face a new problem: adversarial examples. Szegedy was the ﬁrst
researcher who introduced this concept, explaing how easy it was alter the
class predicted by the network applying a small but smart perturbation of
pixels in the input to an image classiﬁer: this perturbation is the so-called
adversarial examples or fooling images.
Contribution of this thesis The aim of this thesis was the design and
the implementation of a technique for adversarial image detection in image
classiﬁcation performed through artiﬁcial neural networks. Since adversarial
perturbation does the most damage in the last level of a neural network (i.e. the
classiﬁer), we decided to focus on the study of the activations of neurons (deep
features) in layers that precede the classiﬁer, in order to infer some properties
that make adversarial images distinguishable from original ones. The thesis
followed these steps: ﬁrst, two state-of-the-art methods for generating fool-
ing images and techniques used to make more robust a DNN were tested and
studied; second, adversarial examples were generated through such methods
from several original images by using a Convolutional Neural Network; third,
deep features of original and fooling images were extracted from hidden layers
of the network. Finally, we performed k-Nearest-Neighbors (kNNs) by com-
paring these features with the ones extracted from the whole training set, in
order to verify if adversarial examples were close to the predicted class of the
CNN classiﬁer or not.
Experimental results about preliminar tests and ﬁnal experiment will be
provided, wishing that this work will be helpful in future researches.
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Chapter 1
Background
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have recently led to signiﬁcant improvement in
many areas of machine learning, from speech recognition to computer vision.
The main skill of DNNs is the ability to take a raw input and trasform it into a
representation at a higher, slightly more abstract level. To do this DNNs make
computations that sometimes are diﬃcult to interpret and can have counter-
intuitive properties. In particular, it was shown [1] that applying a well-chosen
perturbation of pixels in the input to an image classiﬁer, we can completely
alter the class predicted by the network: this perturbation is called adversarial
examples or fooling images. Tipically, the diﬀerence between the original and
perturbed image is imperceptible to a human observer.
Adversarial examples are interesting for two fundamental aspects. First, they
demonstrate that machine learning methods do not yet truly understand the
tasks they are asked to perform, even though they often achieve human level
performance. Second, adversarial examples also have important implications
for computer security, because although they are designed to fool a speciﬁc
model of a neural network (say model A), they are also able to fool another
model (say model B): we call this cross-model generalization of adversarial
examples. When the two models are trained on a diﬀerent training set we
get the so called cross-dataset generalization. Cross-model and cross-dataset
generalization imply that adversarial examples pose a security risk even un-
der a threat model where the attacker does not have access to the target's
model deﬁnition, model parameters, or training set. The attacker can prepare
a training set (for the same task), train a model on their own training set, cre-
ate adversarial examples that mislead their own model, and then send these
adversarial examples against the target system.
Many attemps were made to discover the causes of these fooling images and
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early explanations have suggested it is due to nonlinearity of a deep neural
networks and overﬁtting. Only recently researches argued that, despite the
previous hypothesis, the primary cause of neural networks' vulnerability to
adversarial perturbation is their linear nature.
For better understanding how an adversarial works, we'll start explaining
brieﬂy what is a Convolutional Network (because this model works well in
visual tasks), then we'll describe what an adversarial example exploits to fool
the classiﬁer and what happen in a ConvNet when this kind of image is given
as input.
1.1 Convolutional Network
Convolutional Network1 (also called ConvNet or CNN) is a powerfull tool for
image processing and computer vision tasks. CNN is very similar to ordinary
neural networks: its neurons have learnable weights and biases, receives some
inputs, performs a dot product and optionally follows it with a non-linearity.
The whole network still expresses a single diﬀerentiable score function, starting
from the raw image pixels and ending to class scores. It still have a loss
function (e.g. SVM/Softmax) on the last (fully-connected) layer. So what
is the diﬀerence between them? These networks take advantage of the fact
that the input consists of images and they constrain the architecture in a
more sensible way. This special architecture takes inspiration from the human
visual cortex, where neurons respond to stimuli in a restricted region of space
known as the receptive ﬁeld. Unlike a traditional neural networks, in which
each hidden layers are made up of a set of neurons, where each neuron is
fully connected to the ones in the previous layer, convolutional networks have
neurons arranged in 3 dimensions: width, height, depth (note that depth refers
to the third dimension of an activation volume, not to the depth of a full neural
network). For example, an image in CIFAR-10 with size 32x32x3 (32 width, 32
height, 3 color channels - red green blue) is an input volume of activations, and
the volume has dimensions 32x32x3 (width, height, depth respectively). Hence,
the neurons in a layer will only be connected to a small region of the layer
before it, instead of all of the neurons in a fully-connected manner. Moreover,
since images in CIFAR-10 are grouped in 10 classes, the ﬁnal output layer have
1for further details on Convolutional Network architecture see the following link:
http://cs231n.github.io/convolutional-networks/
http://neuralnetworksanddeeplearning.com/chap6.html
https://ujjwalkarn.me/2016/08/11/intuitive-explanation-convnets/
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dimensions 1x1x10, because the last layer of the ConvNet architecture reduces
the full image into a single vector of class scores, arranged along the depth
dimension.
Usually a ConvNet is made up by stacking three main type of layers: Con-
volutional Layer, Pooling Layer and Fully-Connected Layer.
1.1.1 ConvNet Layers
Convolutional Layer The Convolutional layer is the core building block of a
CNN and derives its name from the convolution operator. The primary purpose
of this layer is to extract features from the input image. Convolutional layer
preserves the spatial relationship between pixels by learning image features
using small squares of input data.
Parameters of a Convolutional layer consist of a set of learnable ﬁlters (or
kernels), which have a small receptive ﬁeld, but extend through the full depth
of the input volume. To be more precisely, each neuron in the ﬁrst hidden layer
will be connected to a small region of the input neurons, say, for example, a
5Ö5 region, corresponding to 25 input pixels. So, for a speciﬁc hidden neuron,
we might have connections that look like this:
Figure 1.1: Local receptive ﬁeld
The region with black circles in the ﬁgure above forms the local receptive
ﬁeld for a hidden neuron (it is like a little window on the input pixels). Each
connection learns a weight. And the hidden neuron learns an overall bias as
well. We then slide the local receptive ﬁeld across the entire input image. For
each local receptive ﬁeld, there is a diﬀerent hidden neuron in the ﬁrst hidden
layer.
During the forward pass, each ﬁlter is convolved across the width and
height of the input volume, computing the dot product between the entries of
the ﬁlter and the input and producing a 2-dimensional activation map of that
ﬁlter. As a result, the network learns ﬁlters that activate when they see some
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Figure 1.2: Diﬀerent local receptive ﬁelds
speciﬁc type of feature at some spatial position in the input. The more number
of ﬁlters we have, the more image features get extracted and the better the
network becomes at recognizing patterns in unseen images.
The size of the Feature Map (Convolved Feature) is controlled by three
parameters:
 Depth: corresponds to the number of ﬁlters we use for the convolution
operation.
 Stride: is the number of pixels by which we slide our ﬁlter matrix over
the input matrix. When the stride is 1 then we move the ﬁlters one pixel
at a time. When the stride is 2, then the ﬁlters jump 2 pixels at a time
as we slide them around. Having a larger stride will produce smaller
feature maps.
 Zero-padding: Sometimes, it is convenient to pad the input matrix
with zeros around the border, so that we can apply the ﬁlter to bordering
elements of our input image matrix. A nice feature of zero padding is that
it allows us to control the size of the feature maps. Adding zero-padding
is also called wide convolution, and not using zero-padding would be a
narrow convolution.
Pooling Layer A Pooling layer is periodically inserted between successive
Convolutional Layers. Its scope is to progressively reduce the spatial size of
the input representation. In particular, pooling:
 reduces the dimensionality of the feature maps;
 reduces the number of parameters and computations in the network,
hence, controls overﬁtting;
 makes the network insensible to small transformations, distortions and
translations in the input image.
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Spatial Pooling can be of diﬀerent types: Max, Average, Sum, etc. In case of
Max Pooling, we deﬁne a spatial neighborhood (for example, a 2Ö2 window)
and take the largest element from the rectiﬁed feature map within that window.
In addition to Max Pooling, the pooling units can also perform other functions,
such as Average Pooling or even L2-norm Pooling. In practice Max pooling
is the most used operation, which has been shown to work better than the
others.
In summary, the pooling layer:
 Accepts a volume of size W1ÖH1ÖD1
 Requires two hyperparameters:
 their spatial extent F,
 the stride S
 Produces a volume of size W2ÖH2ÖD2 where:
 W2=(W1=F)/S+1
 H2=(H1=F)/S+1
 D2=D1
 Introduces zero parameters since it computes a ﬁxed function of the input
We can see an example of Pooling Layer in ﬁgure 1.3.
(a) The input volume of size
[224x224x64] is pooled with ﬁl-
ter size 2, stride 2 into output
volume of size [112x112x64].
Notice that the volume depth
is preserved.
(b) The most common downsampling opera-
tion is max, giving rise to max pooling, here
shown with a stride of 2. That is, each max is
taken over 4 numbers (little 2x2 square).
Figure 1.3: Max Pooling Layer and Max Pool operation
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Fully-Connected Layer The Fully Connected layer is a traditional Multi
Layer Perceptron (MLP) that uses tipically a softmax activation function in
the output layer. The term Fully Connected means that every neuron in the
previous layer is connected to every neuron on the next layer. Its purpose is to
use these features for classifying the input image into diﬀerent classes based on
the training dataset. Moreover, adding a Fully-Connected layer is also a cheap
way of learning non-linear combinations of these features. Most of the features
from convolutional and pooling layers may be good for the classiﬁcation task,
but combinations of those features might be even better.
The sum of output probabilities from the Fully Connected layer is 1 beacuse
the Softmax function takes a vector of arbitrary real-valued scores and squashes
it to a vector of values between zero and one that sum to one.
Introducing Non Linearity (ReLU) A Rectiﬁed Linear Unit (ReLU) is
an additional operation used after every Convolution operation. It is applied
per element and replaces all negative pixel values in the feature map by zero
(see ﬁgure).
Figure 1.4: ReLU
The scope of a ReLU is to introduce non-linearity in a ConvNet, since most
of the real-world data we would want ConvNets to learn would be non-linear
(Convolution, matrix moltiplication, etc. are all linear operations).
1.1.2 ConvNet training
In ﬁgure 1.5is shown a complete ConvNet architercture2, with all the layers
previously described stacked.
The Convolutional and Pooling layers act as Feature Extractors from the
input image while Fully Connected layer acts as a classiﬁer.
The overall training process of the Convolution Network consists of two
stages: forward and backpropagation. The ﬁrst stage starts with the random
2http://deeplearning.net/tutorial/lenet.html
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Figure 1.5: Graphical illustration of a LeNet model. The lower-layers are composed
to alternating convolution and max-pooling layers. The upper-layers however are fully-
connected and correspond to a traditional MLP (hidden layer + logistic regression). The
input to the ﬁrst fully-connected layer is the set of all features maps at the layer below.
initialization of all the ﬁlters, parameters and weights. Then a training image
is given as input to the network; this input goes through the convolutional,
ReLU and pooling layers. At the end of the foward step the output resulting
from previous layers is put into the Fully Connected layer, where the ConvNet
ﬁnds the output probabilities for each class and calculates the total error.
The backpropagation step is used to calculate the gradients of the error with
respect to all weights in the network. Gradient descent algorithm is used
to update all ﬁlter values, weights and parameters to minimize the output
error. The weights are adjusted in proportion to their contribution to the
total error. When the same image is input again, output probabilities will be
closer to the target vector. This means that the network has learnt to classify
this particular image correctly by adjusting its weights and ﬁlters such that
the output error is reduced. Parameters like number of ﬁlters, ﬁlter sizes,
architecture of the network etc. have all been ﬁxed before the propagation
phase and do not change during training process. Only the values of the ﬁlter
matrix and connection weights get updated.
The two stages are repeated for all the images in the training set.
1.2 Linear explanation of adversarial
Now that we know the basic concept of a Convolutional Network, we can
understand how an adversarial example fools the classiﬁer and what are the
weakness that it exploits [1].
Suppose we have a network when neuron's output is just the weighted sum
of its inputs (linear model) and suppose that the precision of a single input
feature ε is contained in a range of ﬁnite values.
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Figure 1.6: Neuron in a neural network.
Now we construct an adversarial like this:
x′ = x+ η
where x is the original input and η is a perturbation smaller than ε.
Theorically, there is no reason for the classiﬁer to assign a diﬀerent class to x
and x′ until ‖η‖∞ < ε.
Consider the dot product between a weight vector w and an adversarial exam-
ple x′:
w>x′ = w>x+ w>η
With this kind of perturbation the activation grows by w>η. Moreover, If w
has n dimensions and the average magnitude of its elements is m, then it will
grow by ε ·m · n. Since this is subjected to the max norm constraint on η, we
can maximize it by assigning η = sign(w).
Since ‖η‖∞is upper bounded but the change in activation caused by perturba-
tion by η can grow linearly with n, then it happens that we can make many
inﬁnitesimal changes to the input that add up to one large change to the
output.
The use of linear functions makes models susceptible for an attack. Con-
vNets are a complex Deep Learning model that expresses a highly non-linear
function. However, the components that make up a ConvNet are linear: Con-
volution of a ﬁlter with its input is a linear operation, sliding a ﬁlter through
the input and computing dot products is also a linear operation, matrix mul-
tiplications too.
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Figure 1.7: Example linear classiﬁers for a few ImageNet classes. The weights can be
thought of as a template: the images show what the classiﬁer is looking for. For example,
Granny Smith apples are green, so the linear classiﬁer has positive weights in the green color
channel and negative weights in blue and red channels, across all spatial positions.
1.2.1 Fooling a linear classiﬁer
For better understanding the impact of this minimal perturbation, lets fool a
linear classiﬁer3. In a linear classiﬁer every class score is computed as a dot
product between all the image pixels and a learnable weight vector, one for
each class. With input images of size width ∗ height ∗ 3 and 1000 ImageNet
classes we therefore have width∗height∗3∗1000 weights and 1000 biases. We
can then visualize each of the learned weights by reshaping them as images
(see ﬁgure 1.7).
Suppose we have already trained a model. We can start to produce fooling
images. Since the classiﬁer is linear we don't need the backpropagation step.
This is because the score function is a dot product s = w>x , then the gradient
on the image x is simply ∇xs = w. Hence, we take an image we want to
corrupt, and then if we want the classiﬁer thinks that it belongs to another
class, we have to take the weights corresponding to the desired class, and add
some fraction of those weights to the image (ﬁgure ).
Figure 1.8: The starting image (left) is classiﬁed as a goldﬁsh. If we add a small amount
"daisy" weights to the image (last row, middle) the classiﬁer is convinced that it's looking
at one with high conﬁdence.
3Complete example is available on http://karpathy.github.io/2015/03/30/breaking-
convnets/
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Teeny tiny example We can understand this process in even more detail
by simplifying the problem into a very elementary example.
Suppose we train a binary logistic regression, where the probability of class
1 is deﬁned as follow:
P (y = 1|x;w, b) = σ(w>x+ b)
where
σ(z) =
1
1 + e−z
is the sigmoid function that put the class 1 score s = w>x+ b into the interval
[0, 1], where 0 is mapped to 0.5.
This classiﬁer hence decides that the class of the input is 1 if σ(s) > 0.5.
Consider now the following input x and weight vector w:
x = [2,−1, 3,−2, 2, 2, 1,−4, 5, 1]
w = [−1,−1, 1,−1, 1,−1, 1, 1,−1, 1]
If we do the dot product, we get -3. Hence, probability of class 1 is 1
1+e−(−3) =
0.0474. In other words the classiﬁer is 95% certain that this is example is class
0. We're now going to try to fool the classiﬁer. That is, we want to ﬁnd a tiny
change to x in such a way that the score comes out much higher. We trying to
buil an adversarial x′ by adding +0.5 to all the elements in the weight vector:
x′ = [1.5,−1.5, 3.5,−2.5, 2.5, 1.5, 1.5,−3.5, 4.5, 1.5]
The dot product now becomes 2 and the probability of class 1 1
1+e−2 = 0.88.
We improved the probability of class 1 from 4.74% to 88% only with a small
amount of increment.
If we generalize all the maths computation to an image that has much more
dimensions than this simple example, we can build an adversarial example
making little changes across all of them in such that we can improve the score
of any class we want the image falls.
1.3 Adversarial robustness of a linear classiﬁer
We just saw how a linear classiﬁer can be easily fooled. Now, the fundamental
question relying this subject is the follow: can we establish a limit of the
robustness of classiﬁers? If this is the case, what is the diﬀerence between
random noise and adversarial noise? Fawzi et. all [3] proposed an upper
bound on the robustness valid for all classiﬁer, indipendently of the training
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procedure. They drew up mathematical deﬁnitions for this concept.
In order to better explain the subject they started by analizing a binary
classiﬁer, i.e. a classiﬁer that outputs input data in two classes.
Let μ the probability measure on Rdof the data point we want to classify
having bounded support, such that Pµ(‖x‖2 ≤ M) = 1 for some M > 0.
Assume y(x) ∈ {−1, 1} be the label of a point x ∈ Rd and µ1and µ−1 be
the distribution of class 1 and class -1. Let f : Rd → R an arbitrary
classiﬁcation function with a classiﬁcation rule obtained by calculating its sign.
We can deﬁne the following notions:
Risk Probability of misclassiﬁcation according to μ:
R(f) = Pµ(sign(f(x)) 6= y(x)) = p1 · Pµ1(f(x) < 0) + p−1 · Pµ−1(f(x) ≥ 0)
where p±1 = Pµ(y(x) = ±1). In other words, risk is the probability that a
classiﬁer assign to the input x a wrong label, that is the union of two mutually
exclusive terms: the probability that the input belong to the class ±1 and
the probability that the sign of f(x) is opposite to the label (i.e. ∓1).
4adv(x; f) The norm of the smallest perturbation that changes the sign of
f :
4adv(x; f) = min
r∈Rd
‖r‖
subject to f(x) · f(x + r) ≤ 0. Notice that the perturbed point x + r is not
required to belong to the dataset.
Robustness to adversarial perturbation The average of 4adv(x; f) over
all x.
ρadv = Eµ(4adv(x; f))
4unif ,ε(x; f) As we can see in ﬁgure 1.9, it can be seen as the maximal radius
of a sphere centered in x, such that perturbed points sampled uniformly at
random from this sphere are classiﬁed siimilarly to x with high probability.
Given ε ∈ [0, 1], then:
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Figure 1.9: Diﬀerence between norms of points perturbated with random uniform noise
and adversarial noise. Red line denote the classiﬁer decision boundary. 4adv(x; f) is equal
to the distance from x and this line. The spherical cap region below this line has measures
ε, meaning that the probability that a random point sampled on the sphere has label +1 is
1− ε.
4unif,ε(x; f) = max
η≥0
η
such that PnvηS(f(x)f(x + n) ≤ 0) ≤ ε, where ηS denotes the uniform
measure on the sphere centered at 0 and of radius η in Rd. This radius provide
an upper bound to the adversarial norm 4adv(x; f) for all ε.
Robustness to random uniform noise The average of the uniform ran-
dom noise:
ρunif,ε(f) = Eµ(4unif,ε(x; f))
We apply all of this notions to a linear classiﬁer, in order to retrieve its
robustness. Suppose we have the usual classiﬁcation function f(x) = w>x+ b,
described in the previous section. Suppose further that bias b is bounded by
|b| ≤M‖w‖2. In this case the adversarial perturbation is given by
4adv(x; f) = |w
>x+ b|
‖w‖2
and this is equal to the distance from x to the hyperplane {f(x) = 0}. The
robustness is given by
ρadv(f) ≤ ‖p1Eµ1(x)− p−1Eµ−1(x)‖2 +M(|p1 − p−1|+ 4R(f))
If b = 0 and p1 and p−1 are equally likely events, such that their probability
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is equal to p±1 = 12 , the above deﬁnition can be simpliﬁes as follow:
ρadv(f) ≤ 1
2
‖Eµ1(x)− Eµ−1(x)‖2 +M(|p1 − p−1|+ 4R(f))
The robustness to an adversarial perturbation, hence, is the sum of two
terms: the ﬁrst one is the diﬀerence between the ﬁrst order moment of the
two distribution µ±1and measures the distinguishability of the two classes; the
second one is the risk R(f). Moreover, the ﬁrst term is indipendent from
the classiﬁcation function and when the diﬀerence between the means of the
distributions is small, then the robustness depends only from the risk R(f).
The robustness of the linear classiﬁer with image of size
√
d × √d to a
random uniform noise is instead given by:
ρunif,ε(f) ≥ max(C1(ε)
√
d, 1) · ρadv(f)
ρunif,ε(f) ≤ C˜2(ε, d) · ρadv(f) ≤ C2(ε)
√
d · ρadv(f)
C1(ε) =
1√
2ln( 2
ε
)
C˜2(ε, d) =
1√
1−(12ε) 1d
C2(ε) =
1√
1−12ε
We can see how a linear classiﬁer is more robust to a uniform random noise
by a factor of
√
d.
1.4 Techniques for generating adversarials
As we mentioned above, neural networks are too linear to resist linear adver-
sarial perturbation. ReLUs and maxout networks [4] are all easy to optimize
because they are designed to behave in very linear ways. Other models which
instead use nonlinear activation function (for example, sigmoid function) are
carefully adjusted to stay in the non-saturating zone for the same reason; how-
ever in this regime the behaviour is always quite linear.
Researchers took advantage of this weakness and implemented many tech-
niques to generate fooling images, such as fast gradient sign, box contrained
and evolutionary algorithms.
1.4.1 Fast Gradient sign method
One way to generate adversarial examples is to use the fast gradient sign
method [2]. This method exploit the back-propagation learning algorithm
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and stochastic gradient descent.
A perturbation is added to the original data sample, and this perturbation
is proportional to the sign of the gradient back-propagated from the output to
the input layer.
Mathematically speaking, let θ be the parameters of a model, x the input
to the model, y the targets (the desired output) associated with x and J(θ;x; y)
be the cost function used to train the neural network. The cost function can
be linearize around the current value of θ, obtaining an optimal max-norm
constrained pertubation of
η = εsign(∇xJ(θ;x; y))
This is the fast gradient sign method of generating adversarial examples.
Note that the gradient can be computed easier using backpropagation.
Practically, an adversarial can be created by training an input image
with these steps (notice that during the back-propagation pass the weights are
freezed and not updated):
 Propagate the input x forward to the output layer as in standard back-
propagation.
 Calculate the error and back-propagate the gradient all the way to the
input layer.
 Update the input with the perturbation η such that we get the new input
x′ = x+ η.
It was found that this technique is able to fool diﬀerent types of models.
Several experiments were performed, with diﬀerent conﬁguration of the pa-
rameters, and some of these ones have results quite interesting. For example,
setting ε = 0.25 and giving as input these fooling images to a shallow softmax
classiﬁer and to a maxout network, they caused an error rate respectively of
99.9% and of 89.4% on a MNIST test set, with an average conﬁdence of 79.3%
for the ﬁrst classiﬁer and with an average conﬁdence of 97.6% for the second
one. Using a diﬀerent setting (ε=0.1) on a Convolutional maxout network with
a preprocessed CIFAR-10 test set, it was obtained an error rate of 87.15% and
an average conﬁdence of 96.6%.
Obviously there are many simple methods of generating adversarial exam-
ples. For example, it is enough rotate x by a small angle in the direction of
the gradient to produces adversarial examples.
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Figure 1.10: A demonstration of fast adversarial example generation. By adding an
imperceptibly small vector whose elements are equal to the sign of the elements of the
gradient of the cost function with respect to the input, we can change the classiﬁcation of
the image. This adversarial was generated to fool GoogleLeNet model. Here our of .007
corresponds to the precision ε of an 8 bit image encoding after GoogLeNet's conversion to
real numbers.
1.4.2 Evolutionary Algorithms
Several researches have found another method to generate an adversarial ex-
ample. This method actually was not created to really fool a neural network,
but it was built because they tried to answer to a question regarding the high
performances of CNNs in image recognition tasks. This question was What
diﬀerences remain between computers and human vision?.
This technique is called Evolutionary Algorithm (EA) [5] and is able to to
produce images that are completely unrecognizable to humans, but that DNNs
believe to be recognizable objects with 99.99% conﬁdence. More precisely, they
choose the AlexNet DNN trained on the 1.3M Image ILSVRC 2012 ImageNet
and the LeNet model trained on MNIST dataset and then created images with
this algorithm that DNNs believed with high conﬁdence as belonging to each
dataset class.
1.4.2.1 Generating image with evolution
EAs are inspired by Darwinian evolution. They consists of a population of or-
ganisms (in this case, images) in which we can keep the best and then performe
random perturbation, such as mutation and/or crossover. The organisms are
selected depending on the ﬁtness function, which in this case is the highest pre-
diction value given by a DNN to an image for a certain class. Instead of using
traditional EAs (they evolving images to match a single ImageNet class), it is
used a new algorithm called theMultidimensional Archive of Phenotypic Elites
(MAP-Elites), which is able to simultaneously evolve a population that con-
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Figure 1.11: Left side: DNN recognizes natural images. Right side: Images produced by
EA that fool DNNs.
tains individuals that have high score on many classes (e.g. all 1000 ImageNet
classes). MAP-Elites does the following steps:
 keep the best individual found for each objective.
 At each iteration, choose a random organism from the population, mu-
tates it randomly, and replaces the current champion for any objective if
the new individual has higher ﬁtness on that objective. Here, ﬁtness is
determined by sending the image to the DNN; if the image generates a
higher prediction score for any class than has been seen before, the newly
generated individual becomes the champion in the archive for that class.
The EA was tested with two diﬀerent encodings, meaning how an image
is represented as a genome. The two types of encodings are called direct and
indirect.
Images produced by these encodings are shown in ﬁgure 1.13
Direct encoding This encoding has:
 one grayscale integer for each of 28x28 pixels for MNIST;
 three integers (H, S, V) for each of 256x256 pixels for ImageNet.
Each pixel value is initialized with uniform random noise within the [0,255]
range. Those numbers are independently mutated; each of them have a certain
probability of being chosen to be mutated. This probability starts with the
value 0.1 (10% of probability) and drops by half every 1000 generations. The
numbers chosen to be mutated are then altered via the polynomial mutation
operator with a ﬁxed mutation strength of 15.
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(a) Images that MNIST DNNs believe
with 99.99% conﬁdence are digits 0-9.
Each column represents a digit class, and
each row consist of the result after 200
generations of a randomly selected, inde-
pendent run of evolution.
(b) Images that MNIST DNNs believe
with 99.99% conﬁdence are digits 0-9.
The column and row descriptions are the
same as for (a).
Figure 1.12: Direct (a) and indirect (b) encoding for LeNet model, trained on MNIST
dataset
Indirect encoding This encoding produces much more regular images, mean-
ing images that contain patterns (symmetry and repetition). The indirect en-
coding here is a compositional pattern-producing network (CPPN), which can
evolve complex, regular images that re-semble natural and man made objects.
1.4.2.2 Evolving images to match MNIST
There were evolved several images both in direct and indirect encoding to
match MNIST dataset.
Direct encoding The directly encoded images were declared by LeNet to
be digits from 0 to 9. Multiple, independent runs of evolution repeatedly
produce images that this DNNs believe with 99.99% conﬁdence to be digits,
but are unrecognizable for humans. Result after 200 generations are are shown
in ﬁgure 1.12.
Indirect encoding As we previously described, a CPPN is used to evolve
recognizable images. As a result, images contain more strokes and other reg-
ularities, and LeNet labels these unrecognizable images as digits with 99.99%
conﬁdence after only a few generations. By 200 generations, median conﬁ-
dence is 99.99%. Certain patterns repeatedly evolve in some digit classes that
appear indicative of that digit. As we can see in ﬁgure 1.12, images classiﬁed
as a 1 tend to have vertical bars, while images classiﬁed as a 2 tend to have a
horizontal bar in the lower half of the image.
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1.4.2.3 Evolving images to match ImageNet
There were also evolved several images both in direct and indirect encoding to
match ImageNet dataset.
Results for both methods are shown in ﬁgure 1.13.
Direct encoding In this case the directly encoded EA was less successful
at producing high-conﬁdence images. Even after 20,000 generations evolution
failed to produce high-conﬁdence images for many categories. However, evo-
lution did manage to produce images for 45 classes that are classiﬁed with
> 99% conﬁdence to be natural images.
Indirect encoding Once again, we test whether the CPPN encoding might
produce more recognizable images than the direct encoding. In 5 independent
runs, evolution produces many imges with DNN conﬁdence scores > 99.99%,
but that are unrecognizable. High-conﬁdence images are found in most cat-
egories. While a human would not label a CPNN image as belonging to the
class given by AlexNet, the generated images do often contain some features
of the target class (see ﬁgure ).
For many of the produced images, one can begin to identify why the DNN
believes the image is of that class once given the class label. This is because
evolution needs only to produce features that are unique to, or discriminative
for, a class, rather than produce an image that contains all of the typical
features of a class.
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(a) (b)
Figure 1.13: a) Evolved images that are either directly (top) or indirectly (bottom) en-
coded. DNNs trained on ImageNet believe with > 99.6% certainty to be a familiar object. b)
Images selected to showcase diversity from 5 evolutionary runs. The diversity suggests that
the images are non-random, but that instead evolutions producing discriminative features
of each target class. The mean DNN conﬁdence scores for these images is >99.12%.
(a) Median conﬁdence scores of 21.59%
from 5 runs of directly encoded, evolved
images for all 1000 ImageNet classes.
For 45 classes, evolution can produce
images that the DNN believes with over
99% conﬁdence to be in a natural, Im-
ageNet class.
(b) Median conﬁdence scores of 88.11%
from 5 runs of CPPN encoding, evolved
images for all 1000 ImageNet classes.
Evolution can produce many images that
the DNN believes with over 99% conﬁ-
dence to belong to ImageNet classes.
Figure 1.14
1.4.3 Box constrained method
Box Constrained [1] [6] is one of the ﬁrst method created to deceive a neural
network. The fundamental idea here is to construct a small perturbation of the
data point x in order to force the method to misclassify the training example
x with some incorrect label y′. The adversarial examples are generated for
a given training point (x; y) by using L-BFGS to solve the box-constrained
optimization problem.
Suppose we have a pre-trained classiﬁer p = f(X) that, for each input
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X ∈ I, corresponding to the pixels of a ﬁxed sized image, outputs a vector
of probabilities p = [p1, · · ·, pi, · · ·, pn] of the image belonging to the class
label i. Let h be the label of the highest probability ph. Assume further that
I = [L=U ], for grayscale images, or I = [L=U ]3 for RGB images, where L
and U are the lower and upper limits of the pixel scale. Assume that c is the
correct label.
This method starts with h = c, otherwise there is no point in fooling
the classiﬁer. It adds the smallest distortion D to X, such that the highest
probability will no longer be assigned to h. The distortions must keep the
input inside its space, hence, it must ensure that X +D ∈ I. In other words,
the input is box-constrained.
Thus, we have the following optimization:
minimizeD‖D‖+ C ·H(p, pA)
subject to L ≤ X +D ≤ U, p = f(X +D)
where we introduce the adversarial probability target pA, which assigns zero
probability to all but a chosen adversarial label a. H is the cross-entropy
between the probability assignments. The constant C balances the importance
of the two objectives. The lower the constant, the more we will minimize
the distortion norm. Values too low, however, may turn the optimization
unfeasible. We want the lowest, but still feasible, value for C.
Through this method researchers realized for the ﬁrst time that adversarial
examples had the two properties of cross-model and cross-dataset generaliza-
tion: indeed, a relatively large fraction of fooling images was misclassiﬁed by
diﬀerent models of networks (e.g. trained with diﬀerent hyper-parameter) and
by networks trained with a disjoint training set. As we can see in tables 1.1
and 1.2, diﬀerent models of neural networks are chosen to test the cross-model
generalization.
Tables , show the cross-dataset generalization. The training set of MNIST
(60k images) has partitioned in two parts P1 and P2; each of them has size
30k. Three non-convolutional networks with sigmoid activations are trained
on them:
 FC100-100-10 and FC123-456-10 were trained on P1;
 FC100-100-10 on P2.
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Model Name Description Training error Test error Av. min. distortion
FC10(10−4) Softmax with λ = 10−4 6.7% 7.4% 0.062
FC10(10−2) Softmax with λ = 10−2 10% 9.4% 0.1
FC10(1) Softmax with λ = 1 21.2% 20% 0.14
FC100-100-10 Sigmoid network λ = 10−5, 10−5, 10−6 0% 1.64% 0.058
FC200-200-10 Sigmoid network λ = 10−5, 10−5, 10−6 0% 1.54% 0.065
AE400-10 Autoencoder with Softmax λ = 10−6 0.57% 1.9% 0.086
Table 1.1: Diﬀerent models to tests the generalization of adversarial images on MNIST
dataset
FC10(10−4) FC10(10−2) FC10(1) FC100-100-10 FC200-200-10 AE400-10 Av. distortion
FC10(10−4) 100% 11.7% 22.7% 2% 3.9% 2.7% 0.062
FC10(10−2) 87.1% 100% 35.2% 35.9% 27.3% 9.8% 0.1
FC10(1) 71.9% 76.2% 100% 48.1% 47% 34.4% 0.14
FC100-100-10 28.9% 13.7% 21.1% 100% 6.6% 2% 0.058
FC200-200-10 38.2% 14% 23.8% 20.3% 100% 2.7% 0.065
AE400-10 23.4% 16% 24.58% 9.4% 6.6% 100% 0.086
Table 1.2: Cross-model generalization of adversarial examples. First column speciﬁes the
models for which the adversarial examples are generated. Columns from second to seventh
speciﬁes the error induced by fooling images sent to a diﬀerent model. Last column shows
average distortion necessary to reach 0% accuracy on the training set.
The reason the researchers have trained two networks for P1 was to study the
cumulative eﬀect of changing the network permarameters and the training sets
at the same time. Models FC100-100-10 and FC100-100-10' share the same
perparameters: both of them are 100-100-10 networks, while FC123-456-10
has diﬀerent number of hidden units. In this experiment, there were distorting
the elements of the test set rather than the training set.
Model Error on P1 Error on P2 Error on test Min. av. distortion
FC100-100-10 trained on P1 0% 2.4% 2% 0.062
FC123-456-10 trained on P1 0% 2.5 2.1% 0.059
FC100-100-10' trained on P2 2.3% 0% 2.1% 0.058
Table 1.3: Models trained to study cross-training-set generalization of the generated ad-
versarial examples. Errors presented in Table correpond to original not-distorted data.
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FC100-100-10 FC123-456-10 FC100-100-10'
Distorted for FC100-100-10 (av. stddev=0.062) 100% 26.2% 5.9%
Distorted for FC123-456-10 (av. stddev=0.059) 6.25% 100% 5.1%
Distorted for FC100-100-10' (av. stddev=0.058) 8.2% 8.2% 100%
Table 1.4: Cross-training-set generalization error rate for the set of adversarial examples
generated for diﬀerent models.
1.5 Solutions to make more robust a neural net-
work
After the discovery of adversarial examples, several methods for improving the
robustness of the neural networks has been explored.
1.5.1 Training adversarial examples
Because it was thought that one of the main causes of adversarial examples
was overﬁtting, the ﬁrst solution adopted was the augmentation of the training
set with these fooling images. The data augmentation is one of the principle
techniques used to regularize models and control overﬁtting; tipical schemes
provide augmentation data with transformations such as translations that are
expected to actually occur in the test set. This form of data augmentation
instead uses inputs that are unlikely to occur naturally but that expose failures
in the ways that the model conceptualizes its decision function.
This method was applied for all the types of adversarials examples.
Data augmentation with box constrained adversarials
A pool of adversarial examples was mixed into the original training [1]. A sub-
set of these fooling images has continuously replaced by newly generated ad-
versarials. In this way it was trained a two layer 100-100-10 non-convolutional
neural network with a test error below 1.2%. The network gets to 1.6% errors
when regularized by weight decay alone and it has be improved to around 1.3%
by using carefully applied dropout.
Data augmentation with fast gradient sign adversarials It was found
that training with an adversarial objective function based on the fast gradient
sign method [2] was an eﬀective regularizer:
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J ′(θ, x, y) = α · J(θ, x, y) + (1− α) · J(θ, x+ εsign(∇xJ(θ, x, y)))
where α = 0.5. The set of adversarial is continually updated, to make
them resist the current version of the model. The tests were done on MNIST
dataset, on a maxout network with dropout and early stopping, so that it
terminate learning after the validation set error rate has not decreased for 100
epochs. The error rate was reduced from 0.94% without adversarial training to
0.84% with adversarial training. With adversarial training, while the valida-
tion set error was very ﬂat and reached the stability over time, the adversarial
validation set error was not. Thus early stopping is used on the adversarial
validation set error. The network was then retrained on all 60,000 examples.
The training was run ﬁve times; each of this running has diﬀerent seeds for
the random number generators used to select subset of training examples, ini-
tialize weights, and generate dropout masks. As result there are four trials
with an error rate of 0.77% on the test set and one trial with an error rate of
0.83%. The model also became somewhat resistant to adversarial examples.
With adversarial training, the error rate decreased from 89.4% to 17.9%. Re-
garding cross-model generalization, fooling images generated via the original
model yield an error rate of 19.6% on the model trained with adversarials,
while adversarial examples generated via the new model yield an error rate of
40.9% on the original model. For the new model the average conﬁdence on a
misclassiﬁed example was 81.4%.
Data augmentation with evolutionary adversarials Unlike the previ-
ous training where adversarial are mixed to the whole training set, in this
case the latter is augmented by adding a new class (called for example fool-
ing images) that include these examples [5]. Strictly speaking, a network can
be retrained and say that the images that previously fooled it should not be
considered belonging to any of the original classes, but instead should be rec-
ognized as a new fooling images class.
Tests are performed with CPPN-encoded images on both MNIST and Im-
ageNet DNNs. The procedure is the follow:
 train DNN1 on a dataset (ImageNet or MNIST);
 evolve CPPN images that produce a high conﬁdence score for DNN1 for
the n classes in the dataset;
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 put these images into the dataset and form a new class n+ 1;
 train DNN2 on this enlarged dataset;
 (optional) repeat the process, but put the images that evolved for DNN2
in the n + 1 category instead in a n + 2 class, because any images that
fool a DNN are anyway fooling images and can thus go in the n + 1
category. To represent diﬀerent types of images, at each iteration m
images (randomly sampled from both the ﬁrst and last generations of
multiple runs of evolution that produce high conﬁdence images for DNNi)
are added in the n+ 1 category.
Each evolution run on MNIST or ImageNet produces 20 and 2k images respec-
tively, with half from the ﬁrst generation and half from the last.
Regarding MNIST, to make the n+1 class have the same number of images
as the other classes of this dataset, in the ﬁrst iteration 6k images (taken from
300 evolutionary runs) are added to the training set. For each additional
iteration, 1k new images are added to the training set. In this case retraining
LeNet model with the new class did not improve its robustness. Evolution
still produces many unrecognizable images for DNN2 with conﬁdence scores
of 99.99%. Furthermore, repeating the process training 15 DNNs with images
that fooled DNN1 through DNNi=1 is useless, since evolution can always ﬁnd
new fooling images for DNNi (see ﬁgure 1.15).
Regardind ImageNet, the original training dataset was extended with a
1001st class, to which 9k images are added that fooled DNN1. Although an
ImageNet class contains up to 1300, it was found that having a new fooling
class with the same number of images did not prevent fooling. Contrary to
the MNIST's results, for ImageNet models, evolution was less able to evolve
high conﬁdence images for DNN2 than DNN1. The median conﬁdence score
signiﬁcantly decreased from 88.1% for DNN1 to 11.7% for DNN2 (ﬁgure 1.16).
To see whether this DNN2 had learned features speciﬁc to the CPPN images
that fooled DNN1, or whether DNN2 learned features general to all CPPN
images, several recognizable CPPN images (taken from Picbreeder.org) were
sent to DNN2. Despite DNN2 has never seen those images, it correctly classiﬁed
64% of them. The retrained model thus learned features generic to CPPN
images, helping to explain why producing new images that fool DNN2 is more
diﬃcult.
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Figure 1.15: Columns are digits 0..9. Rows are DNNi for i = 1...15. Each row shows the
10 ﬁnal, evolved images from one randomly selected run (of 30) per iteration. Medians are
taken from images from all 30 runs.
Figure 1.16: Green line: median and max conﬁdence scores for DNN1. Orange line:
median and max conﬁdence scores for DNN2 with images that fooled a previous DNN1.
1.5.2 Noise injection
Another strategy to immunize a neural networks from adversarials is based on
additional corruptions [7]. In this sense the experiments use additive Gaussian
noise and Gaussian blurring.
Figure 1.17 shows the trade-oﬀ between the adversarial examples recovered
and the clean examples misclassiﬁed as one varies the amount of additive
noises. For ConvNet model, adding a Gaussian noise of σv = 0.1 at L* allow
the model to recover more than 35% at the price of a small loss in model
performance on clean data.
Gaussian blurring is only applied at input layer. The results show that
convolution works well in recovering from the adversarial examples. For exam-
ple, applying Gaussian blur kernel of size 11 to all input data a ConvNet can
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Figure 1.17: Gaussian additive noise: Test error on clean data (Left) and on adversarial
data (Right) in respect to the standard deviation of Gaussian additive noise. L1 refers
to the noise applied at input layer; L* refers to the noise applied at input layer plus all
hidden layers.
recover more than 50% of adversarial examples, at the price of 3% increasing
in the test error on clean data (Table 1.5).
However, neither Gaussian additive noises or blurring is able to remove
enough noise such that its error on adversarial examples is almost equal to the
error on clean data.
Blur kernel size - 5 11 - 5 11
N100-100-10 1.8% 2.6% 11.3% 99.9% 43.5% 62.8%
N200-200-10 1.6% 2.5% 14.8% 99.9% 47.0% 65.5%
AE400-10 2.0% 3.2% 16.6% 99.6% 68.3% 78.8%
ConvNet 0.9% 1.2% 4.0% 100 53.8% 43.8%
Table 1.5: Gaussian blurring: Test error on clean data (Left) and on adversarial data
(Right) in respect to the blur kernel size
1.5.3 Auto Encoder
An Auto Encoder4 (AE) takes an input x ∈ [0, 1]dx and maps it (with an en-
coder) to a hidden representation h ∈ [0, 1]dh through a deterministic mapping:
h = se(Wx+ bh)
where se is the encoder's non-linear activation function (for example, a sigmoid
z = 1
1+e−z ), W is the dh×dx weight matrix and b ∈ Rdh . The hidden represen-
tation h, is then mapped back (with a decoder) into a reconstruction y of the
4For further details on autoencoder architecture and its variants see
http://deeplearning.net/tutorial/deeplearning.pdf
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Figure 1.18: Autoencoder
same shape as x. The mapping happens through a similar transformation:
y = sd(W
′h+ b′)
where sd is the decoder's non-linear activation function (for example, sigmoid
z = 1
1+e−z ), W
′ is the dx × dh weight matrix and b ∈ Rdx .
y should be seen as a prediction of x, given the code h. When we have tied
weights, the weight matrix W ′ of the reverse mapping may be constrained to
be the transpose of the forward mapping: W = W>.
Given m training data points, the learning process of an AE is simply
described by ﬁnding the model parameters θ = {W,W ′, b, b′} that minimize
the following objective function:
JAE(θ) =
m∑
i=1
L(x(i), y(i))
where L is a loss function penalizing y for being dissimilar from x, such as
the L2 norm of their diﬀerence.
Researchers trained a 3-hidden-layer autoencoder (784-256-128-256-784
neurons) on mapping adversarial examples back to the original data samples.
They also trained the model to map original training data back to itself, so that
the autoencoder preserves the original data if the non-adversarial data samples
are fed in. The autoencoder was training using adversarial examples from the
training set only, and cross-model generalization capabilities of adversarial
examples was tested.
It was observed that AEs generalize very well on adversarial examples from
diﬀerent models. All autoencoders are able to recover at least 90% of adver-
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N100-100-10 N200-200-10 AE400-10 ConvNet
N100-100-10 2.3% 2.4% 2.3% 5.2%
N200-200-10 2.3% 2.2% 2.2% 5.4%
AE400-10 3.6% 3.5% 2.7% 9.2%
ConvNet 7.7% 7.6% 8.3% 2.6%
Test error (clean) 2.1% 1.9% 2.1% 1.1%
Avg adv distortion 0.049 0.051 0.043 0.038
Table 1.6: Cross-model autoencoder generalization test. Error rates on adversarial test
data. Columns indicate whose adversarial data the autoencoder is trained on, rows indicate
whose adversarial test data the autoencoder is used to denoise. Entries correspond to error
rates when the outputs from the autoencoder is fed into the model identiﬁed by the row
labels.
sarial errors, regardless of the model from which it originates. However one
drawback was found: the autoencoder and its corresponding classiﬁer can be
stacked to form a new feed-forward neural network, then adversarial examples
can again generated from this stacked network, which is even more susceptible
to adversarial noises.
1.5.4 Denoising Auto Encoder
Denoising Auto Encoders (DAE) is a stochastic version of the auto-encoder
and it is based on a simple concept: in order to force the hidden layer to
discover more robust features and prevent it from simply learning the identity,
an autoencoder is trained to reconstruct the input from a corrupted version of
it.
Intuitively, a DAE does two things: try to encode the input (preserve the
information about the input), and try to undo the eﬀect of a corruption pro-
cess stochastically applied to the input of the auto-encoder. The stochastic
corruption process randomly sets some of the inputs (at least half of them) to
zero. Hence the denoising auto encoder tries to predict the corrupted (miss-
ing) values from the uncorrupted (non-missing) values, for randomly selected
subsets of missing patterns.
Researcers trained a standard DAE without the knowledge of the adversar-
ial noise distribution. At each training batch, each pixel in the input data is
corrupted by adding independent Gaussian noise with 0 mean and σv standard
deviation.
Results are reported in table 1.7. DAE can still recover a signiﬁcant portion
of the adversarial noises. However, this model also suﬀers the same deﬁciency,
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N100-100-10 N200-200-10 AE400-10 ConvNet
DAE, σ = 0.1 5.0% 4.9% 11.5% 9.1%
DAE, σ = 0.5 10.0% 10.6% 16.3% 15.3%
Table 1.7: Denoising autoencoder test. Error on the adversarial test data.
that a stacked network is more susceptible to adversarials.
1.5.5 Deep Contractive network
A Deep Contractive Network (DCN) [7] is a generalization of the Contractive
Auto Encoder (CAE), which is a variant of an autoencoder with an additional
penalty, corresponding to the Frobenius norm of the Jacobian matrix of the
encoder activations with respect to the input. This forces the model to learn
a function that does not change much when x changes slightly. Because this
penalty is applied only at training examples, it forces the autoencoder to learn
features that capture information about the training distribution.
For CAE, the objective function has an additional term:
JCAE(θ) =
m∑
i=1
L(x(i), y(i)) + λ‖∂h
(i)
∂x(i)
‖2
where λ is a scaling factor that trades oﬀ reconstruction objective with
contractive objective. ‖∂h(i)
∂x(i)
‖2 is the Frobenius norm of the Jacobian matrix
of h(i) with respect to x(i).
A Deep Contractive Network (DCN) outputs y ∈ Rdx with a target t ∈ Rdy .
For a network with H hidden layers, let fi denote the function for computing
hidden representation hi ∈ Rdh at hidden layer i: hi = fi(hi=1), i = 1...H +1,
h0 = x and hH + 1 = y. Ideally, the model should penalize the following
objective:
JDCN(θ) =
m∑
i=1
L(t(i), y(i)) + λ‖∂y
(i)
∂x(i)
‖2
However, this penalty is computationally expensive, because of partial
derivatives at each layer in the standard back-propagation framework. Hence,
it used an approximation of the above objective function, i.e.:
JDCN(θ) =
m∑
i=1
L(t(i), y(i)) +
H+1∑
j=1
λj‖
∂h
(i)
j
∂h
(i)
j−1
‖2
Result of the experiments are shown in table 1.8 and 1.9. The models were
30
trained until their accuracy reach almost the same value the one in the original
models without a contractive penalty. Thanx to the contractive penalty the
minimum distortion of the adversarial noises is increased. Table 1.9 shows how
Deep Contractive Networks are more robust than a standard neural network
trained with Gaussian input noise. In addiction, the minimum distortion of
adversarial noises can be improved by combining a DCN with the Gaussian
input noise.
Model Name DCN error DCN avg. distortion orig. error orig. adv. distortion
N100-100-10 2.3% 0.107 1.8% 0.084
N200-200-10 2.0% 0.102 1.6% 0.087
AE400-10 2.0% 0.106 2.0% 0.098
ConvNet 1.2% 0.106 0.9% 0.095
Table 1.8: The error rates on clean test data and the average distortion of adversarial
examples generated from the original model (orig) and the same model with contractive
penalty (DCN). The error-rates on the adversarial examples are 100%.
Training condition Test error Avg. distortion
DCN 2.0% 0.102
GN,L1,σv = 0.1 1.8% 0.095
GN,L*,σv = 0.1 2.0% 0.099
DCN+GN,L1,σv = 0.1 2.2% 0.108
Table 1.9: The error rates on clean test data and the average distortion on adversarial
examples from N200-200-10 models with diﬀerent training conditions. GN stands for Gaus-
sian additive noise during training. L1 means that the noise is applied only at input layer,
L* noise to the input layer + hidden layers.
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Chapter 2
Preliminar tests
In this chapter we have gathered all the preliminary analysis that have been
done to study the nature of adversarial examples. We investigated in a detailed
way the euclidean space of image features by taking a couple of classes from
the ImageNet training set and comparing all the original images with fooling
images generated from them.
2.1 OverFeat
Before starting to discuss the statistics distributions obtained, we take a mo-
ment to introduce the neural network used for features extraction and genera-
tion of the adversarial images. We chose OverFeat [8], which is a Convolutional
Network-based image features extractor and classiﬁer. This network is already
trained on the ImageNet1 2012 training set.
This neural network is a modiﬁed version of the typical Alex Network ; dur-
ing the training process it uses the same ﬁxed input size approach proposed in
[9], but turns to multi-scale for classiﬁcation. According to the constant input
dimentionality required by the Alex Network model, OverFeat take all the full-
resolution images of ImageNet and down-sample them to a ﬁxed resolution of
256 pixels. In other words, given a rectangular image, the network ﬁrst rescale
it such that the shorter side is of length 256 and then, from the resulting im-
age, it crop out the central 256× 256 patch. After that, 5 random crops (and
their horizontal ﬂips) of size 221x221 pixels are extracted and presented to the
network in mini-batches of size 128.
Parameters of the network are setted as follow:
1For further details on ImageNet dataset structure visit the site http://www.image-
net.org/about-overview
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Model Top-1 error Top-5 error
AlexNet 40.7% 18.2%
OverFeat fast 39.28% 17.12%
Table 2.1: Error rates for classiﬁcation task on validation set
Layer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Stage conv+max conv+max conv conv conv+max fc fc fc
# of channels 96 256 512 1024 1024 3072 4096 1000
Filter size 11x11 5x5 3x3 3x3 3x3 - - -
Conv. stride 4x4 1x1 1x1 1x1 1x1 - - -
Pooling size 2x2 2x2 - - 2x2 - - -
Pooling stride 2x2 2x2 - - 2x2 - - -
ZP size - - 1x1x1x1 1x1x1x1 1x1x1x1 - - -
SI size 231x231 24x24 12x12 12x12 12x12 6x6 1x1 1x1
Table 2.2: Fast model architecture. ZP means Zero Padding, SI is Spatial Input. 8 Is the
output layer.
 the weights in the network are initialized randomly with μ = 0 and
σv = 1 × 10=2. Stocastich gradient ascend with momentum term of 0.6
and an l2 weight decay of 1× 10=5 is used to update them;
 the learning rate is initially 5 × 10=2 and is successively decreased by a
factor of 0.5 after {30, 50, 60, 70, 80} epochs.
 DropOut [10] with a rate of 0.5 is employed on the Fully Connected layers
(6th and 7th) in the classiﬁer.
The detailed architecture is summarized in table 2.2. Layers 1-5 are similar
to standard AlexNet, using ReLU and Max Pooling, but with the following
diﬀerences:
 no contrast normalization is used;
 pooling regions are non-overlapping;
 due to a smaller stride in 1st and 2nd layer, resulting feature maps are
larger than AlexNet model.
OverFeat is provided with two diﬀerent models: fast and accurate. We chose
the fast one, which has a top-1 error score of 39.28% and a top-5 error score
of 17.12% (see table 2.1).
Stages of network architecture for the fast model are the following:
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 input 3x231x231
 stage 1: convo: 11Ö11 stride 4Ö4; ReLU; maxpool: 2Ö2 stride 2Ö2;
output (layer 3): 96x24x24
 stage 2: convo: 5Ö5 stride 1Ö1; ReLU; maxpool: 2Ö2 stride 2Ö2;
output (layer 6): 256x12x12
 stage 3: convo: 3Ö3 stride 1Ö1 0-padded; ReLU; output (layer 9)
512x12x12
 stage 4: convo: 3Ö3 stride 1Ö1 0-padded; ReLU; output (layer 12)
1024x12x12
 stage 5: convo: 3Ö3 stride 1Ö1 0-padded; ReLU; maxpool: 2Ö2 stride
2Ö2; output (layer 16) 1024x6x6
 stage 6: convo: 6Ö6 stride 1Ö1; ReLU; output (layer 18) 3072x1x1
 stage 7: full; ReLU; output (layer 20) 4096x1x1
 stage 8: full; output (layer 21) 1000x1x1 output
 stage: softmax; output (layer 22) 1000x1x1
2.2 Generating Adversarial Example
The ﬁrst step of our studies consists on the generation of the adversarial ex-
amples. We therefore retrieved the necessary scripts in order to build them.
We decided to use the Box Constrained and Fast Gradient methods.2
The choice of the class from which create fooling images fell to Kit Fox,
vulpes macrotis.
2.2.1 Fooling images generated with Box Constrained
The script dowloaded for Box Constrained method takes as input an initial
seed, through which the algorithm select randomly an adversarial class. Thus,
the original image sent to this script will be perturbed such that the resulting
2Codes are available on the sites:
- Fast Gradient: https://github.com/e-lab/torch-toolbox/tree/master/Adversarial
- Box Constrained: https://github.com/tabacof/adversarial
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one will be classiﬁed from OverFeat as belongin to the adversarial class with
an high conﬁdence score.
Since the same initial seed gave us the same random adversarial class,
the script allowed us to address our fooling images on a speciﬁc class. The
adversarial class chosed was Pelican.
We generated 5 adversarial images: in ﬁgure 2.1 original images and fooling
ones are shown, with the diﬀerence between them. Notice that the algorithm
perturbed the original images in a very imperceptible way and this perturba-
tion is localized only in that region of the image where probabily features are
characteristic for the class Kit Fox.
2.2.2 Fooling images generated with Fast Gradient
Despite the previous method we were not able to steer the perturbation in
order to choose the adversarial class for the fooling images created, but we was
quite lucky because we managed to get some adversarials with the same class.
The code only allowed us to modify the number of iterations of the algorithm
and the intensity ε of the perturbation. According to [2] we set ε = 0.007. The
number of iteration was set equal to 15, because with a number greater than
it the perturbation was too visible and the script was not able to generate a
good adversarial. We executed the script several times untill we obtained some
adversarials with the same class.
If we analize the fooling images we clearly notice what is the main diﬀerence
between this method and Box Constrained. The diﬀerence is in the localization
of the perturbation: here the noise is distributed throughout the whole image;
this distribution of the perturbation permit the method to jumps from one
class to another untill the max iteration it is reach. As a consequence, Fast
Gradient Sign can generate many types of adversarials, most of these ones are
summarized in 4 main category:
 true adversarial: the original image is classiﬁed correctly by the net-
work, but when perturbed it has a completely unrelated class label;
 re-focused adversarial: with the perturbation the ConvNets re-focuse
their attention from the original entity in the image to a new signiﬁcant
entity present in the same image;
 conaturally adversarial: labels having nuanced synsets, like dog and
cat, lend themselves strongly to such a type of adversarial example. Per-
turbed images of this class mostly fall in the same family, genus or species;
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Classiﬁcation: Kit Fox Classiﬁcation: Pelican
Score: 36.37% Score: 50.96%
Classiﬁcation: Kit Fox Classiﬁcation: Pelican
Score: 47.94% Score: 59.48%
Classiﬁcation: Kit Fox Classiﬁcation: Pelican
Score: 53.49% Score: 99.98%
Classiﬁcation: Kit Fox Classiﬁcation: Pelican
Score: 56.45% Score: 99.98%
Classiﬁcation: Kit Fox Classiﬁcation: Pelican
Score: 87.96% Score: 99.98%
Figure 2.1: Adversarial images generated by Box Constrained. Left column contains
original images. Central column shows the diﬀerence between original and fooling images.
Right column contains adversarial images.
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Classiﬁcation: Kit Fox Classiﬁcation: Dingo
Score: 76.53% Score: 99.96%
Classiﬁcation: Kit Fox Classiﬁcation: Dingo
Score: 47.94% Score: 99.97%
Classiﬁcation: Kit Fox Classiﬁcation: Dingo
Score: 56.45% Score: 92.66%
Figure 2.2: Adversarial images generated by Fast Gradient. Left column contains original
images. Right column contains adversarial images.
 benign adversarial: The original image is misclassiﬁed by the network
(this can be happen since neural networks have an error rate on classiﬁ-
cation task). The adversarial example is instead classiﬁed correctly with
relatively high conﬁdence. These examples are adversarial in the true
sense of the deﬁnition, but are not dangerous.
Adversarials generated by Box Constrained are obviously true adversarial,
while Fast Gradient adversarials are conaturally. Figure 2.2 shows fast gradient
adversarials.
2.3 Analysi of the features space
Once we have created the adversarial samples, we began the study of the
features space. In previous chapter we told about the linear explanation of
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these corrupted images and according to this hypothesis we thought it was
interesting see what happen in a ConvNet in those layers that precede the last
one. This is because an adversarial is made by propagating the perturbation
throughout the network. This modiﬁcation is small but as it goes through the
levels it starts to alter more and more the output of the hidden layers. So, if
we take the output of the hidden layers maybe we could observe some features
that are not so much characteristics of the adversarial class (for which the
classiﬁer believes the image belongs), but they could get closer to the original
class.
Therefore, we started to extract features from the next-to-the-last layer
and we went back into the network. We took the output of stages 6 and 7,
more precisely:
 level 18: output of the ReLU after the convolutional stage. 3072 R+
features each image;
 level 19: output of the Fully Connected layer. 4096 R features each
image;
 level 20: output of the ReLU in the Fully Connected layer. 4096 R+
features each image.
We have extracted the following features:
 classes Kit Fox, Pelican and Dingo of ImageNet training set;
 original samples and corresponding adversarial images generated with
Box Constrained and Fast Method.
2.3.1 Average distances
Suppose we are in the euclidean n-space. Let x = [x1, x2, x3, ..., xn] and y =
[y1, y2, y3, ..., yn] two features vectors, then the euclidean distance d from x to
y (or from y to x) is given by:
d(x, y) =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
(xi − yi)2
We worked both with normalized vectors and non-normalized ones. Recall-
ing the euclidean norm:
‖x‖2 =
√
x21 + ...+ x
2
n
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Fox Pelican
lvl. 20 lvl. 19 lvl. 18 lvl. 20 lvl. 19 lvl. 18
Fox
Avg d1NN 31.23 129.58 65.56 44.1 231.51 78.68
(NV-ED) Avg d1NN 0.76 0.36 0.90 1.24 0.67 1.25
Pelican
Avg d1NN 41.29 175.78 63.57 32.67 117.46 57.9
(NV-ED) Avg d1NN 1.25 0.73 1.26 0.85 0.46 1.00
Table 2.3: Euclidean distances from the 1NN between original images from class Fox and
Pelican. NV stands for Normalized Vector. Bold value are distances performed within the
belongin class of the images.
Fox Dingo
lvl. 20 lvl. 19 lvl. 18 lvl. 20 lvl. 19 lvl. 18
Fox
Avg d1NN 31.23 129.58 65.56 37.75 168.17 73.08
(NV-ED) Avg d1NN 0.76 0.36 0.90 0.99 0.47 1.06
Dingo
Avg d1NN 33.38 145.99 64.02 28.84 120.94 59.88
(NV-ED) Avg d1NN 1.04 0.51 1.11 0.86 0.43 0.99
Table 2.4: Euclidean distances from 1NN between original images from class Fox and
Dingo. NV stands for Normalized Vector. Bold value are distances performed within the
belongin class of the images.
The normalized vector of X is a vector in the same direction but with norm
(length) 1. It is denoted Xˆ and given by
Xˆ =
X
‖X‖2
We performed cross-distances between original and adversarial classes and
distances between the images within a same class. We calculated the centroid
of the classes and took the average distance from it; we also took the distance
from the First Nearest Neighbor (1NN) for each image and by the end we
averaged all of the distances collected. In this section we only report the
d1NN distances: complete tables with all the distances retrieved are reported
in Appendices.
The ﬁrst anomaly that we noticed is that altought adversarials was seen
by the classiﬁer only belonging to the adversarial class, distance from their
1NN stayed below the average d1NN, and this happends both for original and
adversarial class. This behaviour was more visible in layers 19 and 18 (see
tables 2.5 and 2.6).
We therefore performed 1NN distributions within the classes Kit Fox, Peli-
can and Dingo, in order to verify how far were adversarial images from original
ones. In other worlds, we knew that original images belongin to a same class
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(a) Non-normalized vectors (b) Normalized vectors
Figure 2.3: Distribution of the d1NN distances in class Kit Fox.
(a) Non-normalized vectors (b) Normalized vectors
Figure 2.4: Distribution of the d1NN distances in class Pelican.
had on average a certain 1NN distance (tables 2.3, 2.4); we wanted to know
how many 1NNs had distance less than the adversarial 1NN: we catched this
concept with percentiles. Distributions of 1NN distances for Kit Fox class are
summarized in ﬁgures 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5.
Results were interesting. For example, considering the distances obtained
with normalized vectors (table 2.7), we observed that 3 of 5 original images
(taken from Kit Fox class to form the corresponding adversarial with Box Con-
strained method) had more or less half of the d1NNs less than their, meaning
that they were located between the centroid and the peripheral region of the
class; instead 1 had almost all the d1NNs greater than its, thus it was located
near the centroid of the class. Finally 1 had all of the d1NNs less than its, so
probabily its stayed in the peripheral region of the class. All of these results
were coeherent to the classiﬁcation score given to the images (ﬁgure 2.1). Sim-
ilar discussion can be done regarding original images taken to generate Fast
Gradient adversarials (table 2.8): in level 20 they had more or less 60% of
1NNs less than their; while in level 19 and 18, 2 of 3 images got closer to the
centroid of the class. Obviously output of level 20 is coherent to the classiﬁca-
tion score obtained for these images. If we watch adversarials percentiles we
can not do same considerations: their value were not consistent with classiﬁca-
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(a) Non-normalized vectors (b) Normalized vectors
Figure 2.5: Distribution of the d1NN distances in class Dingo.
tion score: although fooling images were classiﬁed with an high score, in level
20 they seemed to locate quite far both from adversarial and original class;
even more important, going back to level 18 they are closer to Kit Fox class
than the Pelican/Dingo.
All this leaded to some questions: suppose we combine into a unique class
the two original/adversarial classes and suppose we take the k-Nearest Neigh-
bors (k-NNs) for an adversarial example, how many neighbors belong eﬀec-
tively to the adversarial class? How many instead of the original one? To
answer these question we'll introduce the last of the preliminary experiment,
which consists of search of k-NNs.
2.4 Search of kNNs
As the last experiment, we have created two main classes:
 class 1: all the original images from Kit Fox and Pelican classes plus
adversarial examples generated with Box Constrained algorithm (∼ 2600
images);
 class 2: all the original images from Kit Fox and Dingo classes plus
adversarial examples generated with Fast Gradient Sign method (∼ 2600
images).
We searched for the k-NNs for all the images belonging to these classes. More
precisely, for each image in classes 1 and 2 we searched how many Foxes are
in their Nearest Neighbors. Parameter k can assume a value within the range
[1,2400] with steps of 100. The search was done in OverFeat layers 20,19,18.
We chose to perform the search with normalized vector.
As depicted in ﬁgures 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8, original Fox images belonging to
class 1 had on average almost 100% of Foxes until k ' 1300 (this was obvious
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because each class had at most 1300 images, according to ImageNet dataset);
Fox images in class 2 had less Foxes, at least 80%, but it was because, despite
a pelican, a dingo is much similar to a fox. Original Pelicans in class 1, had on
average less than 10% of Foxes until k ' 1300 and this is visible in all the levels
20,19 and 18 of OverFeat. Original Dingo images in class 2 had instead from
30% to 40% of Foxes in levels 20 and 19, but it became more distinguishable
in level 18, when they had less than 10% of Foxes.
Final discussion for adversarials: considering the ones generated with Box
Constrained, 2 of 5 adversarial are impossible to detect (due the proximity to
the Pelican class) neither in layer 20, nor in 19, nor in 18. 1 adversarial of 5
had the 1NN as Fox; moreover, in level 20-19 it already contained 25-30% of
Foxes when k ' 100 and increased to 60% in level 18. The last 2 adversarials
in level 20 had at most 30% of Foxes until k ' 1300, while in levels 19 and 18
their 1NN became Fox and the percentage of Foxes increased to 50% in level
19 and to 60% in level 18.
Regarding Fast Gradient adversarials, their k-NNs contained less than 20%
of Foxes in level 20, while in layer 19 the number increased up to 30-40%; in
level 18 we had similar percentage of Foxes but 2 of 3 adversarial now had
1NN as Fox.
Conclusion Studying all the statistics previously collected togheter with
the latter results, we decided to extend the search of k-NNs, by generating
adversarial examples keeping randomly original images from the ImageNet
validation set, and comparing them with the whole ImageNet training set. We
chose layer 18 for the features extraction because it seemed work better in
adversarial detection.
(a) class 1: Kit Fox-Pelican plus Box
Constrained adversarials. Lines for Fox
and Pelican are an averaged kNNs.
(b) class 2: Kit Fox-Dingo plus Fast
Gradient adversarials. Lines for Fox
and Dingo are an averaged kNNs.
Figure 2.6: class 1-2: kNNs layer 20
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(a) class 1: Kit Fox-Pelican plus
Box Constrained adversarials. Lines
for Fox and Pelican are an averaged
kNNs.
(b) class 2: Kit Fox-Dingo plus
Fast Gradient adversarials. Lines
for Fox and Dingo are an aver-
aged kNNs.
Figure 2.7: class 1-2: kNNs layer 19
(a) class 1: Kit Fox-Pelican plus
Box Constrained adversarials. Lines
for Fox and Pelican are an averaged
kNNs.
(b) class 2: Kit Fox-Dingo plus Fast
Gradient adversarials. Lines for Fox
and Dingo are an averaged kNNs.
Figure 2.8: class 1-2: kNNs layer 18
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Chapter 3
Final experiments
Relying on preliminary test results, we thought it could be a good solution
to support externally a neural network, by comparing its classiﬁcation output
with the k-Nearest Neighbors found for the classiﬁed image.
To do this, we extended the previous experiments using the whole ImageNet
dataset and OverFeat, a Convolutional Network-based image classiﬁer and fea-
ture extractor, trained on the dataset used for the ILSVRC-2012 competition
- 1000 classes, 1.2M+ training and 150k testing images.
The experiment required six steps:
1. features extraction of the whole training set;
2. random selection of 1000 images from the validation set (which is a sub-
set of 50k images of the testing set) and generation of 2000 adversarial
examples from them, obtaining a set of 3000 queries ;
3. features extraction from the queries;
4. for each feature array in 3. search of the kNN and store them in a ﬁle;
5. for each query in 2. classify it with Overfeat and retrieve the classcode
of the classiﬁcation, count the occurrence of the classcode looking up the
kNN list and decide if it is an original image or an adversarial one.
6. retrieve main statistics of the experiment, such as speciﬁcity, sensitivity,
etc.
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3.1 Features extraction
The ﬁrst part of the ﬁnal test consisted in preparing all the inputs to give to
our software.
In order to extract the features from all the images in our experiment, we
used OverFeat. This neural network is provided in two models: accurate and
fast. We chose the latter. In particular we extracted them from level 18 (stage
6 of the fast model), because (as we have seen in the previous chapter) this
was the level where adversarials were more distinguishable from the original
images. For each image the number of feature maps in this layer is 3072. The
corresponding size of feature maps is 1Ö1. All the feature maps were ﬂattened
into a single feature vector. As a result, the corresponding size of a feature
vector is 3072.
Figure 3.1: Architecture speciﬁes fast model
Since training set is divided in 1000 classes (each of them containing up to
1300 images) we stored all the features arrays in as many ﬁles as the number
of the classes.
Afterwards, we randomly selected 1000 images from the validation set (one
for each class). From these ones we generated adversarials examples using Fast
Gradient Sign and Box Constrained methods. More precisely, given an image,
we created two fooling images: one with the ﬁrst method and one with the
second one. All of these adversarials are random, meaning that the class in
which they have been classiﬁed by Overfeat and by our experiment (software?)
was not chosen at priory. Both original and fooling images form our queries
set.
Once the queries set has been formed, we extracted all the features vectors
and stored them into separated ﬁles.
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(a) Original image, clas-
siﬁed by OverFeat as
stingray
(b) Adversarial gener-
ated with Box Con-
strained method, classi-
ﬁed by OverFeat as cock-
roach
(c) Adversarial generated
with Fast Gradient
method, classiﬁed by
OverFeat as Border
terrier
Figure 3.2
3.2 Knn lists and classiﬁcation of the queries
with OverFeat
In the second part of our experiment we classiﬁed the queries in two ways:
using our software and using OverFeat. These two type of operations can be
performed in parallel.
3.2.1 Software classiﬁcation
The parameters needed for the classiﬁcation are:
1. k: number of nearest neighbors to retrieve;
2. advThreshold: threshold set to decide if an image is an adversarial or
not.
Given a query (for the sake of correctness its feature array), the software cal-
culated the euclidean distance between it and the tc features vectors belonging
to a class c of the training set (tc ∈ [732, 1300]). As a result, the total number
of the euclidean distances calculated was
∑1000
c=1 tc. During this process, a pri-
ority queue of the kNNs is mantained in main memory. When a new distance
is calculated, it is compared with the element having the max distance in this
queue: if it is greater than this element, it is discarded, else it is inserted into
the queue. At the end of the comparisons, the queue was saved in ascending
order (according to the euclidean distance with normalized vectors) into a ﬁle.
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Figure 3.3: Example of a kNN txt ﬁle
We obtained 3000 lists of kNNs. In ﬁgure 3.3 it is shown an example of a
kNN list (the name of the ﬁle is equal to the name of the query), where each
row in a single list was made up by the concatenation of these ﬁelds:
1. the classcode in which belong the neighbor;
2. the euclidean distance (using normalized vector) between the neighbor
and the query;
3.2.2 OverFeat classiﬁcation
We gave as input all the images in the queries set. The output of the classiﬁ-
cation is given by a textual description of the class in which OverFeat believes
that the image belongs. We saved all the classiﬁcations in classiﬁcation.txt
ﬁle, where each row contains the name of the query followed by the description
of the class and the score of the classiﬁcation.
Figure 3.4: classiﬁcation.txt
3.3 Adversarial detection
The crucial part of the experiment was the detection of the adversarials. At
this step the software processed all the information previously acquired. In
addiction to these informations, it needed for another ﬁle given by OverFeat:
synset_words.txt. This document combines the textual description of a
class in ImageNet dataset with its code.
Hence, given a query, it:
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Figure 3.5: Synset_words.txt
1. opens classiﬁcation.txt, searches for the name of the query and re-
trieves the textual description of the classiﬁcation done by OverFeat;
2. opens synset_words.txt, searches for the textual description of the
class and gets the classcode;
3. opens kNN list of the query, counts the occurrences of the classcode;
4. veriﬁes if the number of the occurrences is greater than the advThresh-
old parameter: if is it true then the query is not an adversarial image,
meaning that there is a suﬃcient number of neighbors belonging to the
same class given by OverFeat to assume that the image is a safe one;
5. stores the result in result.txt, where each row contains: the name of the
query, the classcode given by Overfeat, the number of the occurrences of
the classcode in kNN list, a number set to -1 if it is a safe image or 1 if
it is a fooling one.
Figure 3.6: result.txt
52
3.4 Esperimental results
At the end of the experiment, we analized the results in order to get the main
stastistics. We used the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve anal-
ysis to study the quality of our software. According to the ROC theory we
had two population: the one with the desease (also called Positive), that is
the images detected as adversarials, and the one without the disease (also
called Negative), that is the images detected as safe/originals. The total num-
ber of positive elements was 2000 and the total number of negative elements
was 1000. Since there wasn't a perfect separation of these two populations,
we chose the advThreshold parameter as a cut-oﬀ point/criterion value to
discriminate between the two populations.
Thus, we counted:
1. the queries correctly detected as adversarial (TP = True Positive frac-
tion);
2. the cases with the adversarial has been classiﬁed as safe (FN = False
Negative fraction);
3. the original images correctly classiﬁed as safe (TN = True Negative frac-
tion);
4. the original images that have been considered as fooling (FP = False
Positive fraction).
To check the quality of the software we used this measurement:
 Accuracy: proximity of measurement results to the true value.
Accuracy =
TP + TN
P +N
3.4.1 Uncorrectly classiﬁed images
We needed to put the attention on the types of original queries retrieved from
the random sampling in ImageNet validation dataset. This was because since
OverFeat had a top-1 error score equal to 39.28%, so we expected to have more
or less this percentage of misclassiﬁcation in the 1000 samples kept. Indeed,
the total number of original queries misclassiﬁed by OverFeat was 357.
For the aim of the thesis we excluded them in the generation process of
adversarial examples, because they already had a discordance between Over-
Feat's prediction,our software's classiﬁcation and true ImageNet classiﬁcation.
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 3.7: wrong queries. For each picture it is speciﬁed the true class for ImageNet
dataset, the prediction given by OverFeat, the class of 1NN and predominat class in kNNs.
a) True class: binocular. OverFeat prediction: lakeside, lakeshore. Software classiﬁ-
cation: 1NN=backpack, best=swimming trunk. b) True class: carpodacus mexicanus.
OverFeat prediction: birdhouse. Software classiﬁcation: 1NN=yurt, best=yurt. c)
True class: american chameleon. OverFeat prediction: ladybug. Software classiﬁcation:
1NN=ladybug, best=ladybug. d) True class: hamster. OverFeat prediction: sleeping
bag. Software classiﬁcation: 1NN=hamster, best=hamster.
However, since these queries were adversarials in the true sense of the deﬁni-
tion, they were included in the detection process.
It was interesting to see the diﬀerence between in what the neural network
has predicted and what k-NNs has found our software. We found images in
which OverFeat and our program focused their attention on the background
rather than on the real subject to found: for example, in ﬁgure 3.7a OverFeat
recognized the landshore in front of the guys, while the software saw the
clothes and the backpack of the boy in the middle of the image. In ﬁgure 3.7b
both has detected the house behind the birds. There were cases in which colors
in the picture deceived both the neural network and the tool (3.7c) or cases
where neural network was fooled but our software understood the true class of
the query (3.7d).
3.4.2 Results
In order to make statistics more clear, we divided the percentage of adversarials
detected (True Positives) according to the type of method that has generated
them. Moreover we divided original queries according to the correctness of
their classiﬁcation. Therefore, True Negatives were those images correctly
classiﬁed by OverFeat andWrongs were those ones misclassiﬁed by OverFeat.
3.4.2.1 k=100
We analized results of the ﬁnal test ﬁrst by keeping k = 100 Nearest Neighbors.
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Figure 3.8: k = 100 Cumulative Distribution Function. Ratio between the number of
neighbors having the same class predicted by OverFeat and the total number of k-NNs.
Figure 3.8 shows Cumulative Distribution Functions (c.d.f) of adversarial
examples, True Negatives and wrong queries in terms of percentage of images
having the number of neighbors belonging to the same class given by OverFeat
less than a threshold. In other worlds, for 1% of k we had that almost all TNs
had their 1NN equal to that predicted class; on the contrary, despite the high
conﬁdence in classiﬁcation score, 50% of Fast adversarials and 30% of Box ones
had their 1NN belonging to a diﬀerent class. Moreover, we had that only 5% of
TNs had less than 10% of Nearest Neighbors having the same predicted class,
unlike more than 50% of Box and 70% of Fast adversarials. This behaviour
is interesting, because shows a further approach, in which one could compare
the class in the ﬁrst position of the classiﬁcation ranking with the others that
follow it with a less conﬁdence: for example, if a neural network classiﬁed an
image as cat with an high conﬁdence (say 95%), but in second, third position
(and so on) of the ranking vector there was something diﬀerent from a cat and
its sub-spiecies, then probabily we deal with an adversarial example.
Regarding the accuracy of adversarial detection (ﬁgure 3.9), we had that
with a threshold on k equal to 1, we were able to get 100% of TNs, 30% of Box
adversarials (with an accuracy of 65%), 45% of Fast ones (with an accuracy
of more than 70%) but less than 10% of wrong images; On the contrary, with
a threshold on k equal to 100, TNs drastically fell in 0%; all queries were
detected as adversarials and, therefore, accuracies decrease to 50% both for
Box and Fast ones.
Always in ﬁgure 3.9 there were two interesting points: if we had a constrain
on having or not False Positives, by keeping a threshold on 2% of k, we can get
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all the True Negatives with 60% of Fast adversarials and almost 40% of Box
ones. If we instead are interesting on maintaining the False Positives within a
certain limit, with 25% of k we can detect more than 80% of Fast adversarials,
60% of Box ones and 50% of wrong queries, at the price of a loss of 20% of
TNs.
Figure 3.9: k = 100 search. Picture shows percentages of TN,TP and accuracy of the test
done, compared to the threshold on k.
Figures 3.11 and 3.10 express similar concept: we performed the ratio be-
tween the number of neighbors having the same class predicted by OverFeat
and the number of occurrences of the class that is was mostly found in the
k-NNs: we had 80% of original queries had most frequent class in k-NNs equal
to the predicted one; on the contrary, 80% of adversarial had not most frequent
class in k-NNs equal to the predicted one.
Figure 3.10: k = 100 search. Ratio between the number of neighbors with the same
predicted class and the number of neighbors having the best kNN class.
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Figure 3.11: k = 100 search. Ratio between the number of neighbors with the same
predicted class and the number of neighbors having the best kNN class. This picture is
equal to ﬁgure 3.10, except for TNs which they are speculative.
3.4.2.2 k=1000
We kept also 1000-Nearest-Neighbors in order to see if we can improve results.
Figure 3.12: k = 1000 Cumulative Distribution Function. Percentage of images having
the same class predicted by OverFeat in their k-NNs.
Figure 3.12 shows Cumulative Distribution Functions of adversarial exam-
ples, True Negatives and wrong queries. As for 100-NN search, for 1% of k we
can distinguish clearly the diﬀerence between the distribution of adversarials
and original images: indeed, almost all TNs had their 1NN equal to that pre-
dicted class; while 40% of Fast adversarials and 20% of Box ones had their 1NN
belonging to a diﬀerent class. Finally, we had that only 10% of TNs had less
than 10% of Nearest Neighbors having the same predicted class, unlike more
than 55% of Box and 80% of Fast adversarials. The distribution of wrong
queries is closer to the fooling ones.
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Figure 3.13: k = 1000 search. Picture shows percentages of TN,TP and accuracy of the
test done, compared to the threshold on k.
Figure 3.14: k = 1000 search. Ratio between the number of neighbors with the same
predicted class and the number of neighbors having the best kNN class.
In ﬁgure 3.13 we noticed that for 1NN results we had a similar trend found
in search with k = 100, even if we lost 10% of all type of adversarials; by
bringing the threshold to 10% of k, we reached 90% of TNs and we gained
40% in detecting Fast and Box adversarials. Moreover, detection of wrong
images increased from 5% to 45%.
A good threshold in which we were able to maintain all the TNs was on
2% of k: here we had a good percentage of recognized adversarials (50% Fast,
30% Box and more than 10% of wrong images) with an accuracy greater than
60%.
Last discuss concerns on the percentage retrieved by dividing the number of
neighbors having the OverFeat's predicted class and the number of occurrences
of the best class found in k-NNs search. In ﬁgures 3.14 and 3.15 it is shown
that 60% of original queries had most frequent class in k-NNs equal to the
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Figure 3.15: Ratio between the number of neighbors with the same predicted class and
the number of neighbors having the best kNN class. This picture is equal to ﬁgure 3.14,
except for TNs which they are speculative.
predicted one but 95% of adversarial ones had not.
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Chapter 4
Conclusions
Over the past few years, Artiﬁcial Neural Networks have re-emerged as pow-
erful machine learning models, yielding state-of-the-art results in ﬁelds such
as Computer Vision, Automatic Speech Recognition and Natural Language
Processing. However techniques exist to alter a correctly classiﬁed image into
one apparently identical, that is wrongly classiﬁed. These perturbed images
are generally referred as adversarial examples. The adversarial detection in
image classiﬁcation has become a real challenge.
In this thesis, we ﬁrst discussed various methods to generate adversarials, in
order to understand their nature and make the networks more robust to them.
Today there is no solution to the adversarial detection problem and Neural
Networks are still vulnerable to fooling images. Second, we performed several
experiments on OverFeat, a Convolutional Network classiﬁer and feature ex-
tractor, trained on a subset of the ImageNet dataset used for the ILSVRC-2012
competition. Leveraging on the linear explanation of adversarial examples, we
made an hypothesis: because the perturbation makes the major damage on
the last layer, we could detect a fooling image by analyzing the output of pre-
vious layers of the ConvNet. To prove it, we have formed a set of queries
by selecting randomly several images from one class in ImageNet training set
and for each ones generating two types of adversarials (ﬁrst type with Box
Constrained method and second type with Fast Gradient Sign Method). Suc-
cessively we have compared these queries with the ones contained in the class
of the original images and the ones in the class where adversarials fell. The
comparison was made by extracting the activation of neurons (deep features)
in the three levels preceding the classiﬁer and for each of them we took the
k-Nearest-Neighbors according to the euclidean distance between the query
and the classes chosen from the training set.
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Early outcomes conﬁrmed our inference: they showed an anomaly in what
the network has predicted for a query and the class associated to the Nearest
Neighbors found for it. Therefore, we have tried to generalize the experiment
to the whole ImageNet dataset. For the ﬁnal test we have implemented a tool
(external to the Neural Network). This software searches for k-NNs of a query
and count the occurrences of the class given by OverFeat. If the number of
neighbors is less than a certain threshold, it marks the image as adversarial.
Final results were discussed in terms of True Negatives, False Positives and
accuracy of adversarial detection.
With this thesis we proved that the analysis of the activation of neurons
in the hidden layers of an Artiﬁcial Neural Network can be helpful to address
the issue of adversarials detection. k-NN searching is just one of the many
approaches that can be attempted on those outputs: through this, we were able
not only to retrieve a good percentage of fooling images, but we also captured
the diﬀerences between the adversarials cumulative distribution function and
the one derived from original pictures. This is very important, because an
attack based on fooling images is made by sending non just one adversarial
example at time but sending hundreds of them, and a system can recognized
that there is an anomaly by analyzing the c.d.f. of the ﬂow. Although our
research didn't provide a deﬁnitive solution to the problem (we had to deal
with many False Positive and with the error rate of the Neural Network -
which is obviously present in all networks), we have opened a new interesting
perspective in which to lead future researches about adversarial examples.
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Appendices
In this section are reported the complete statistics done in chapter 2.
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